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ABSTRACT
THE RETRIEVAL OF ATT ITUD INALLY-RELEVANT INFORMATION FROM
MEMORY: EFFECTS ON SUSCEPTIBILITY TO PERSUASION
AND ON INTRINSIC MOTIVATION
September 1980
Wendy Wood, B.S., University of Illinois-Champaign
M.S., Psychology, Ph.D., University of Massachusetts
Directed by: Professor Alice H. Eagly
A comparison between attitude research conducted within the
framework of attribution theory and more classic attitude research
revealed two different perspectives on the nature of attitudes.
Attribution approaches assume that attitude judgments are derived
in large part from contextual cues whereas more traditional
approaches postulate an underlying predisposition toward the
attitude object. It was proposed that these perspectives identify
two means of formulating attitude judgments. Attitudes can be
derived primarily from contextual cues and recent behavior or
primarily from the retrieval of attitudinally-relevant information
from memory. It was hypothesized that new information that
counters initial opinions toward the attitude object would have
a greater impact on context-derived than memory-derived attitudes
because context-derived attitudes are drawn relatively more from
currently available data and less from prior experience and beliefs.
iii
The distinction between memory- and context-derived judgments
was operationalized in terms of subjects* retrieval of attitudinally-
relevant information from memory. Subjects were given two minutes to
list their beliefs about the topic, preservation of the environment,
and two minutes to list their previous experiences with the topic.
Checks revealed that these retrieval tasks appropriately represented
the memory- versus context-derived distinction: Subjects who listed
few, rather than many, behaviors perceived themselves to have
experienced more thought, action, and feelings about preservation
of the environment and to be more knowledgeable and informed.
Results for beliefs were similar, though nonsignificant.
The impact of new information on attitudes was explored
through a persuasion study and an intrinsic motivation study. In
the persuasion research, subjects' opinions were assessed before
and after exposure to a counterattitudinal message arguing against
preservation of the environment. Consistent with a cognitive
response analysis of persuasion, subjects who retrieved few,
rather than many, behaviors produced more counterarguments and
fewer thoughts favorable to the message. These thoughts mediated
opinion change such that subjects who retrieved few, rather than
many, behaviors and few, rather than many, beliefs showed less
opinion change.
In the intrinsic motivation study, subjects' opinions were
assessed before and after they decided to deliver a proattitudinal
message on preservation of the environment. Subjects either
iv
received a $5 reward for their decision or no reward. Consistent
with previous intrinsic motivation research, rewarded subjects
changed their opinions more than not rewarded subjects. Further,
the analysis yielded differences due to the number of behaviors
subjects listed. Subjects who retrieved few behaviors inferred
attitudes consistent with whether or not they were rewarded for the
decision: Rewarded subjects, compared with those not rewarded,
attributed their decision less to belief in preservation and
subsequently became less favorable toward preservation. In contrast,
in the many behaviors groups, rewarded subjects unexpectedly made
a stronger attribution to their belief than not rewarded subjects.
Yet, as predicted, the opinions of subjects who retrieved many
behaviors remained relatively favorable toward preservation.
These findings support the self-perception analysis (Bern, 1972)
that when internal cues, such as prior experiences relevant to
the attitude object, are not accessible, attitudes are inferred
from behavior and the context in which it occurs.
The distinction between memory- and context-derived attitudes
was discussed in terras of recent theories of how the presence or
absence of a self-schema affects processing of schema-related
information. It was argued that the retrieval measures employed in
the present research are superior to the measures commonly used in
the work of self-schemata (e.g., involvement, extremity of
opinions) because extent of retrieval more directly reflects the
degree to which people have access to relevant information in
memory.
v
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
Social psychological research on attitudes stems from at least
two very different traditions. One of these employs the attitude
construct in a manner analogous to traits, emphasizing the enduring
dispositions that underlie an attitude judgment. For example,
McGuire (1969), employing Allport's (1935) definition, proposed
that an attitude is "a mental and neural state of readiness to
respond, organized through experience, exerting a directive and/or
dynamic influence on behavior" (McGuire, 1969, p. 142). Many
classic theories of attitudes, such as learning theories (e.g.,
Staats, 1968) and cognitive consistency theories (e.g., Festinger,
1957), implicitly accepted this view. In contrast, the second
tradition of research emphasizes the temporary nature of attitudes.
According to this view, attitude expressions are often determined
by the information available in the situation in which they are
expressed. This approach has been adopted by attribution theory
(Kelley, 1967, 1972) and self-perception theory (Bern, 1972), which
frequently focus on an individual's construction of his or her
attitude from the situational cues available immediately prior to
assessment.
It is not surprising that attitudes have been conceptualized
in several different ways. Given the complexity and versatility of
2.en-
human cognitive processes that have been noted in other areas
(e.g., Neisser, 1976), it is to be expected that the attitude
literature would reveal that people can formulate attitudes in
different ways, ranging from judgments which reflect stable ori<
tations to more superficial judgments derived from currently avail-
able information.
Others have argued that Bern's (1972) self-perception theory
conceptualizes attitudes in a different manner from more tradition-
al theories. For example, Greenwald (1968) distinguished between
the approaches in terms of the internal or external nature of the
information on which the attitude is based. According to
Greenwald, self-perception theory assumes that an individual's
attitude can be derived from situational cues that can also be
employed by an observer to infer the individual's attitude, and it
assumes that changes in these external cues can lead to attitude
change. In contrast, attitude theories commonly assume that an
individual's attitude provides internal stimuli available only to
him or her, and they have commonly linked attitude change to a
corresponding change in the information internally available to the
individual
.
The present view integrates these two conceptualizations of
attitude into a general framework that views attitude judgments in
terms of the information on which the judgment is based. The tra-
ditional conceptualization of attitudes assumes that people learn a
particular orientation toward the attitude object. Learned
3orientations can be based on affective reactions toward the object,
beliefs about it, and previously expressed positions in reference
to it. It is important to note that the idea of a learned predis-
position implies that attitude judgments are based in large part on
information retrieved from memory. For this reason, such judgments
will be called memory-derived attitudes. In contrast, attribution
theory (Kelley, 1967, 1972) and self-perception theory (Bern, 1972)
employ the term attitude to describe a judgment based on inform-
ation derived from contemporaneous situational factors and one's
recent behavior in relation to the attitude object. According to
this perspective, people formulate an attitude judgment by focusing
primarily on these contemporaneous cues, and they retrieve little
cognitive support for the judgment. This type of judgment will be
called a context-derived attitude because it emphasizes the inform-
ation that is currently available in the situation. It is possible
to explore the characteristics of memory- and context-derived
judgments by contrasting research that considers an attitude judg-
ment to be a reflection of a predisposition to respond with
research that focuses on the way contemporaneous cues are in-
corporated into an attitude inference. Memory-derived attitudes
will be examined through some of the classic attitude theories and
through recent work on the cognitive schemata that may underlie
self-perceptions. Context-derived attitude judgments will be
explored in terms of attribution theory and self-perception theory.
4Self-Attribution of Attitudes
Theories of self-attribution have generally focused on how
perceivers infer their attitudes from a recent or salient behavioral
incident (Bern, 1972; Kelley, 1972; Nisbett & Valins, 1972). These
analyses assume that an attitude judgment is greatly influenced by
contemporaneous cues such as recent behavior except in the infre-
quent case that the inference has been made repeatedly in the past.
It is recognized that then people may invoke these previous judgments.
Research on attitude attribution has generally been concerned
with attitude inference from behavior which is consistent or incon-
sistent with subjects' reports of their initial position on an
issue. In order to simplify the present discussion, the analysis
will draw primarily from research on proattitudinal behavior,
rather than counterattitudinal , because the mechanisms underlying
a proattitudinal inference may be relatively less complex. Attitude
change following counterattitudinal behavior can be explained
through several underlying mechanisms: It can be accounted for by
an increase in cognitive discomfort and subsequent dissonance reduc-
tion through attitude change (Higgins, Rhodwalt, & Zanna
,
1979;
Zanna & Cooper, 1974), or, like a proattitudinal action, it can be
explained through the self-perception process of inferring an
attitude directly from behavior (Bern, 1972; Kleinke, 1978). Even
though the processes underlying these two judgments may at times
differ, the conclusions drawn from the present analysis should be
5applicable to attitude inferences from either pro- or counter-
attitudinal behavior. In both cases, the attitude judgment is
derived from a recent behavioral incident rather than a stable,
organized set of beliefs and affective reactions toward the
attitude object.
Further, our analysis will focus on intrinsic motivation in
preference to other types of proattitudinal research because (a) in-
trinsic motivation research comprises a very large majority of work
in the study of proattitudinal behavior and (b) subjects are
required simply to engage in a behavior and not to develop or read
a persuasive message supporting a position. When subjects are
asked to develop or review arguments in favor of a position they
may be forced to engage in a thorough, though perhaps biased,
analysis of the issue. In the process, subjects may utilize in-
formation other than that currently available in the assessment
situation.
Research on intrinsic motivation, along with other self-
perception research, relies on the fact that behavior caused by non-
attitudinal factors may be misperceived to be relevant to an
attitude judgment. Kelley (1967) has noted that when subjects in
these experiments are asked to perform an activity, they consider
the behavior an indicator of their attitude because they under-
estimate the impact of experimental demand, which is the actual
cause of the behavior. This misperception can lead perceivers to
infer an attitude that is consistent with attitudinally-irrelevant
behavior.
6Intrinsic motivation research typically presents one group of
subjects with a reward for performing a somewhat enjoyable task and
another group engages in the task without the reward. The reward
is then removed, and all subjects are asked to make a general
evaluative rating of the task, commonly operationalized as interest
and enjoyment (Deci, 1971), or preference for the task over others
(Ross, 1975). Often subjects' behavioral performance on the task
before and after the reward is also observed. Rewarded subjects
are generally thought to engage in a causal analysis to determine
whether their behavior is due to the reward or to a favorable
attitude toward the task, whereas nonrewarded subjects have only
their liking for the task as a plausible cause. The comparison be-
tween the rewarded and nonrewarded groups typically indicates that
external rewards decrease favorability toward a task, presumably
because rewarded subjects attribute their behavior to the reward
and nonrewarded subjects attribute it to a favorable attitude.
Researchers of intrinsic motivation analyze the process by
which perceivers identify a cause for their behavior in terms of
the information currently available to perceivers. These analyses
focus on Kelley's (1967, 1972) discounting principle, which follows
Bern's (1972) self-perception theory when applied to inferences
about one's own behavior. According to Bern, subjects often infer
their favorability toward a task from their behavior when external
causes for task performance are not available. In the presence of
external rewards, subjects often attribute their performance to the
7s
reward and assume it is not internally caused.
Self-perception research is frequently conducted with setting
and stimuli that are unfamiliar to subjects (e.g., certain word-
games or mathematical puzzles). Therefore, it is not surprising
that they use contemporaneous cues when initially formulating an
attitude. Indeed, Kelley (in Harvey, Ickes, & Kidd, 1978) has
noted that self-perception research often involves "an experimental
setting in which you're being asked about something you're exper-
iencing for the first time, so you have no self
-concept" in rela-
tion to the issue (p. 379).
There is evidence, however, to suggest that people rely on
contemporaneous cues to infer their attitude even when they have
previous experience with the attitude object. For example, Lepper,
Greene, and Nisbett (1973) either rewarded or did not reward chil-
dren for drawing pictures with magic markers. The children were
then given an opportunity to draw pictures without the reward, and
the amount of time they spent on the task was interpreted as their
liking for the activity. Since all children probably had a chance
to draw pictures prior to participating in the experiment, they
could have invoked this previous experience when evaluating their
attitude. According to Kelley' s (1972) covariance analysis, the
task behavior would be attributed to the cause with which it
covaries, that is, subjects' liking for the activity. Yet those
children who received a reward, compared with those who did not,
spent less time on the activity after the reward was removed. This
8finding would not have been obtained if subjects had conducted a
covariance-type analysis. It appears that subjects instead focused
primarily on the current situation, and rewarded subjects consider-
ed the reward a plausible cause of their behavior. A similar
analysis can be applied to studies utilizing a within-subjects
design, in which participants were first asked to perform a task,
then were given a reward for performing it, and finally were asked
to perform it again without the reward (e.g., Green, Sternberg, &
Lepper, 1976). Subjects in these experiments could utilize the
experiences of performing the task with and without a reward in
formulating their attitude. Yet subjects showed a decrement in
task performance when the reward was removed, presumably because
they utilized their most recent experience of performing the task
for a reward, and considered the reward a plausible cause for
performance. Research on self-perception theory therefore suggests
that when evaluating their attitude, people may focus on the inform-
ation currently available in the situation to the exclusion of
other data.
In order to understand how people can infer an attitude from
an assessment of contemporaneous cues such as a recent behavior, it
is helpful to consider the self-perception process in detail. Bern
(1972) suggests that we observe our behavior and infer that an
action without obvious external cause must correspond to an in-
ternal attitude. But this view of self-perception does not specify
the information on which an attitude judgment is based or the
9process by which this information is identified. The present
analysis will attempt to address these two issues. It will be
argued that the self-attribution process can be understood in
terms of three steps: (1) perceivers identify the plausible causes
for their behavior, (2) they attribute the behavior to a particular
cause(s), and (3) they infer an attitude on the basis of the
identified cause(s). These steps may not always occur as independent
sequential processes. For example, if only one cause is identified,
the first and second steps would be conducted simultaneously.
Identification of causes
. Inherent in our culture's definition of
causality is a general perspective concerning the variety of causal
factors that can produce particular effects. These a priori causal
theories can lead us to favor certain types of explanations for
events (Nisbett & Wilson, 1977). These theories also appear to be
very robust: Intuitive notions about the probable causes for an
event may be employed to the exclusion of causes which have a more
reliable statistical relationship to the event (Ajzen, 1977).
Causal salience may also affect which causal factors are
likely to be identified. Taylor and Fiske (1978) and Pryor and
Kriss (1977) argue that in their attributional processing, per-
ceivers may often employ the most salient causal factor to the ex-
clusion of other plausible causes.
The interpretation of one's own behavior does appear to be
affected by causal salience: Subjects in intrinsic motivation re-
search appear to identify a reward as the cause for their task
10
performance only when the reward is salient (Ross, 1975). When the
reward is present but not salient, subjects appear to explain their
behavior primarily in terms of a favorable attitude toward the
task. Other evidence of the impact of salience is provided by
research on proattitudinal advocacy (Kiesler, Nisbett, & Zanna,
1969; Zanna & Kiesler, 1971). Kiesler, Nisbett, and Zanna (1969)
asked subjects to proselytize an attitude-consistent position on
the topic of air pollution. Those who heard another participant
remark that his or her participation reflected a belief in the
issue (i.e., enhancing the salience of belief as a cause) appeared
to infer that their behavior must also indicate a favorable
attitude, whereas subjects overhearing a remark that participation
reflected a desire to support good research (i.e., enhancing the
salience of a desire for social good) may have inferred that their
behavior was not relevant to their attitude, and indicated a less
favorable position on the issue.
The attitude inference process may not always be affected by
situational factors enhancing the salience of a particular cue(s).
It has been suggested that people's preconceived rules identifying
certain types of information as relevant or salient may also in-
fluence the causes that are identified (Salancik & Conway, 1975).
Salancik and Conway assessed subjects' attitudes toward a college
course after an experimental manipulation had enhanced the salience
of subjects' previous behaviors favorable or unfavorable toward the
course. Course majors appeared to infer their attitude from
11
whichever behaviors were salient. Nonmajors' attitudes, however,
were not affected by the manipulation. Apparently, they inferred
their attitude from their course grade. For nonmajors, liking for
the course may not have been a salient or relevant cause for their
course-related behavior. Favorably-oriented behaviors, such as
working hard in the course, could be the result of an inspiring
instructor or their own good study habits, whereas liking depended
on the grade they received.
There may also be conditions under which people are not affected
by the salience of plausible causes. Taylor (1975) provides evidence
to indicate that the salience of information relevant to subjects'
self-perceptions is quite important when involvement is low, but has
little effect with high involvement. Under high involvement
conditions, subjects appear to conduct a comparatively systematic
analysis of relevant information that utilizes both salient and
nonsalient cues. -Taylor and Fiske (1978) have argued that these
findings do not minimize the importance of salience effects because
low involvement behavior may be characteristic of daily activities.
Plausibility and salience are certainly not the only mechanisms
affecting preferred causal factors. We have argued that perceivers
may sometimes limit their search to contemporaneous causes, and not
conduct a detailed analysis drawing on past experience. In addition,
the familiarity of a causal factor may, under some conditions, make
it a likely candidate for inclusion in a causal analysis. Perceivers
may also have idosyncratic reasons for favoring one type of causal
12
explanation over another.
The number of causal factors that are commonly identified in the
process of explaining an event has recently received some considera-
tion. One view holds that plausibility and salience serve to weight
particular causal factors more than others. This analysis suggests
that more than one cause is initially identified, but the one likely
to be chosen is the one most salient and/or plausible (cf. Anderson,
1971).
Another analysis suggests that salience and plausibility affect
which cause(s) is initially recognized. According to this view,
only the most salient and/or plausible cause features in perceivers'
causal analyses. This perspective has been associated with theoreti-
cal analyses of salience, which hold that perceivers often focus on
one salient cause to the exclusion of other causes (Pryor & Kriss,
1977; Taylor & Fiske, 1978). Others have also noted that causal
analyses may be limited to consideration of one causal factor.
Fischoff (1976) interprets the social prediction literature to
indicate that people are generally not able to handle multi-
variate, conditional thinking. Similarly, Kanouse (1972) argues
that subjects discontinue their search for explanation as soon as a
sufficient cause has been identified, rather than continue the
analysis until the best explanation is achieved. He suggests that
this phenomenon reflects a general bias to view unitary events as
having unitary causes. In a study providing indirect support for
this analysis, subjects were asked to describe two personal failure
13
or rejection experiences and to indicate why the experience occurred
(Janoff-Bulman, Note 1). For 59 percent of the incidents listed,
only one causal factor was identified. The majority of incidents
were explained in terms of a single cause that sufficiently accounted
for the event.
The question of how many causes are commonly invoked during
perceivers' preattribution information search is difficult to resolve.
Research methodologies which provide subjects with a list of plausible
causes cannot be used to assess whether subjects spontaneously infer
more than one cause. Other approaches, such as having subjects list
possible causes for an event, do not provide unambiguous results. For
example, subjects may only list one cause because of disinterest in
the task or inability to recall anything but the factor finally chosen
as the cause.
Attribution to identified cause(s) . At this stage in perceivers'
analysis, an explanation is formulated from the plausible causal
factor(s). If more than one cause has been identified, Kelley's
(1972) discounting principle, augmentation principle, or another
causal schema may be applied to arrive at an explanation. If only
one cause has been recognized, perceivers probably explain the
behavior in terms of this factor.
Attitude inference . The next stage in perceivers' analysis concerns
the inference of an attitude from the chosen cause(s). Attribution
researchers often assume that attributing behavior to an internal
14
cause (oneself) leads to the inference of an attitude evaluatively
consistent with the behavior whereas attribution to an external
cause (the environment) does not allow a clear attitude inference.
However, attitudes cannot clearly be labeled an internal phenomenon
because they are generally assumed to represent a relation between
a person (internal) and an object (external). According to the
present analysis, an attitude inference can result from the location
of cause in either the person or the attitude object, but not in
aspects of the situation, such as time and modality, which can vary
independently of the attitude object (Kelley, 1967)
.
1
In order to distinguish the present causal taxonomy from others
less appropriate (e.g., internal vs. external), location of cause
in the person or the object will be labeled an intrinsic
attribution, and location in the situation will be termed an
extrinsic attribution. Although little consensus exists concerning
the appropriate use of these terms in attribution theorizing, there
is some precedent for the present definition. Researchers of intrinsic
motivation (e.g., Ross, 1976) implicitly consider an intrinsically
motivated activity to be in response to a feature of the attitude
object (i.e., the task) and an extrinsically-motivated activity to be
in response to an aspect of the situation which can vary independently
of the attitude object (i.e., the reward).
To understand the link between causal attributions and attitudes,
it is helpful to consider the attitudinal implications of identifying
a particular cause for a behavior. An interesting study by Salancik
15
rma-
(1976) suggests that different kinds of attitudinally-relevant info
tion are retrieved from memory depending on whether one makes an
intrinsic or extrinsic attribution.
Salancik (1976) elicited subjects' reactions to a college course
for which they had received a high grade. In the experimental con-
ditions that are most relevant to the present analysis, subjects re-
called particular aspects of their experiences with the course,
which included their course-related behavior. Some subjects were
then encouraged to attribute their course behaviors to extrinsic
features of the course (e.g., the course grade, credit toward
graduation) whereas others were not encouraged to make this attribu-
tion. Subjects' attitudes toward the course were then assessed.
As would be expected, those subjects who did not attribute
their behavior extrinsically employed their behavior as an indicator
of their attitude toward the course. But it appears that these
subjects did not infer their attitudes directly from their behavior.
Instead, subjects seem to have recalled a subset of the course char-
acteristics (e.g., lectures, subject matter) which was evaluatively
consistent with the behavior, and based their attitudes on these fea-
tures. Also as predicted, subjects who did make an extrinsic
attribution did not use their course-related behaviors to infer their
attitude. Instead, they inferred attitudes consistent with their
behaviors toward factors extrinsic to the course—behaviors in-
strumental in getting a good grade but not necessarily a reflection
of liking for the course itself. The recall and use of the
16
extrinsically-oriented behaviors appeared to be associated with lack
of recall for the characteristics of the course. Subjects who made
an extrinsic attribution, compared with those who did not, were found
to have less favorable attitudes toward the course, perhaps because
they were unable to recall course characteristics, from whxch favorable
attitudes develop.
It appears that attributing behavior on a likeable task to ex-
trinsic rewards may inhibit the recall of task characteristics, and
may enhance the salience of experiences extrinsic to the task. Because
positive task characteristics are not available to inform the judgment,
a relatively unfavorable attitude results. A similar analysis can
perhaps be applied to an attribution to intrinsic causes of task per-
formance. The characteristics of the likeable activity may be
selectively retrieved, and a favorable attitude results.
To summarize, attitude judgments can be based primarily on con-
temporaneous cues such as one's recent behavior. Research on in-
trinsic motivation indicates that recent behavior can be used to
infer one's attitude toward an activity. This analysis may consist
of several stages: On the basis of causal salience or plausibility,
a cause(s) is identified for the behavior. When more than one cause
is identified, perceivers employ attribution rules, such as the
causal schemata proposed by Kelley (1972), to arrive at an explana-
tion. If the cause reflects something about the person's orientation
toward the activity or something about the activity, then attribution
to the cause may lead to selective retrieval of characteristics of
17
the activity. When task characteristics are positive, a relatively
favorable attitude may be inferred. Conversely, if the cause is
extrinsic to the activity, then attribution to the cause leads to
retrieval of extrinsic rather than intrinsic features. When the
task is attractive, a relatively unfavorable attitude is inferred
because positive task characteristics are not available to be in-
corporated into the attitude judgment.
The inference of an attitude from behavior is one means of con-
structing an attitude judgment from contemporaneous cues. The
initial expression of this attitude will not generally reflect a
stable orientation toward the attitude object because it is not based
on a coherent set of beliefs and affective reactions. Instead, the
inference is linked to the particular cues available in the situation
at the time when the inference is made. Reliance on contemporaneous
cues can lead to predictable biases in judgment. The review of in-
trinsic motivation research indicated that the inference may not take
into account the full impact of the situational determinants of
behavior and it can be based primarily on salient causal factors.
Memory-Derived Attitudes
The theoretical analyses and empirical findings in intrinsic
motivation and self-perception are in sharp contrast to the approach
taken by more traditional attitude theories. According to the latter
view, an attitude judgment is not usually fundamentally determined by
contemporaneous cues that vary with each assessment. Although people
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incorporate new information into their attitude judgment, and the
opinions they express may be sensitive to situational constraints,
the attitude judgment is still thought to primarily be a function
of one's learned response to the attitude object. For example,
cognitive consistency theories (e.g., Festinger, 1957) focus on the
relationship between the existing cognitive structure underlying one's
attitude toward an object and new experiences with the object that
may be consistent or inconsistent with these prior cognitions.
According to this view, changing one's attitude to be consistent with
new experiences is only one of several ways of achieving cognitive
consistency. The major difference between the self-perception view
of attitudes and that taken by some traditional attitude theorists
appears to be the presence of an existing cognitive structure in
relation to an attitude object. Self-perception research focuses on
attitude inferences which are based on information derived from
contemporaneous cues, whereas traditional views of attitude judgments
assume that cognitive structures in memory provide an orientation
toward the attitude object and that this orientation is reflected in
the attitude inference. In order to understand this distinction, it
is helpful to consider the nature and function of the cognitions
which can underlie an attitude judgment.
McGuire (1969) distinguished between two general formulations of
the informational components hypothesized to underlie attitudes.
According to the expectancy-value model, an attitude is a function of
one's beliefs (Fishbein & Ajzen, 1975; Rosenberg, 1956). Fishbein
19
and Ajzen argue that only a limited set of a person's total beliefs
are salient at any one time, and the attitude indicated depends on
which beliefs are salient. Further, salient beliefs are thought to
be arranged hierarchically in memory in terms of the subjective
probability that the belief is correct. The second formulation of
attitude structure assumes that attitudes are comprised of three
components: cognitive, affective, and conative. The cognitive
component consists of beliefs about the object and perceptual
responses, the affective pertains to feelings of liking or dis-
liking about the object, and the conative refers to behavioral
tendencies toward the object. It has been suggested that some
attitudes are composed primarily of one component, whereas others
contain strong elements of several ' components (Katz, 1960).
The two formulations of attitude structure represent divergent
viewpoints. The expectancy-value model is concerned specifically
with the cognitive component of attitudes, and it is usually
validated through its correlation with affect. Proponents of this
view have argued that cognitive, affective, and conative components
are not independent constructs but merely alternate ways of assessing
attitudes (Fishbein & Ajzen, 1975). Some supporters of a multi-
component view have recently argued that although behavioral tenden-
cies may in part reflect the other two components, the cognitive and
affective components represent differentiable aspects of attitudes
(Bagozzi & Burnkrant, 1979; Norman, 1975). Despite these different
perspectives, it is generally agreed that cognition and affect, and
20
perhaps behavior, can contribute to an attitude judgment. Although
the components may encompass redundant information, an attitude can b«
drawn from these different types of information.
In addition to considering the information that can be incor-
porated into an attitude judgment, an examination of the structure of
attitudinally-relevant information in memory is helpful to under-
stand the cognitions that underlie an attitude. Social psychologists
have not traditionally been concerned with the way information is
stored in memory and how it is accessed during attitude assessment.
However, recent work on social cognition illustrates that cognitive
theories can increase our knowledge of social psychological
phenomenon. Wyer and Carlston (1979) argue that network models of
semantic memory can provide some insight 'into the way socially-
relevant information may be stored and accessed.
Network models of semantic memory (e.g., Collins & Loftus,
1975) suggest that concepts are organized hierarchically in memory,
and may be represented as nodes in a network. The concepts that
are stored in semantic memory may take many forms--ranging from
nouns to complex patterns of behavior, such as "what to do if you
see a red light." Nodes which represent an individual's experience
can encompass descriptions of past experiences as well as thoughts.
Properties of the concepts are signified by labeled relational paths
between nodes. For example, a concept and its superordinate may be
connected by a link with the label "is a." The meaning of a concept
is contained in the network of these relations, which link it to
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other concepts. Excitation flows between two concepts when they are
connected in thought, and the association becomes stronger with the
frequency and the recency excitation has been transmitted along the
linking paths. Therefore, how often a person thinks about or uses a
property of a concept can affect how easily that feature is
retrieved.
Concepts and experiences can be stored in memory at varying
levels of abstraction. Abelson's (1976) script theory suggests
that initial exposure to an event tends to be stored at a relatively
concrete level, but with increasing knowledge about the incident,
storage and processing tend to occur at more abstract levels. Apply-
ing this analysis to attitude judgments, it would be expected that
inferences derived from a particular situation will be stored in
memory on a relatively concrete level. As the context-specific
judgment is invoked to guide or explain behavior in new situations,
it may gradually develop beyond its narrow implications into a
relatively abstract concept.
If abstract inferences are to be useful to the perceiver, they
should be linked to a wide range of more concrete judgments and
experiences. Links which spread excitation from the abstract concept
to the concrete may be invoked when perceivers search for specific
support for a generalization. Links allowing excitation to flow from
the concrete to the abstract can provide perceivers with a general
explanation of specific inferences and experiences.
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It is likely that memory-derived attitudes will be represented
in memory in an abstract form. The attitude concept stored in memory
most likely represents a relationship between oneself and an object
or class of objects. Because these attitudes probably develop in
relation to well-known domains, they will probably have received a
large amount of thought, and they may be linked to an evaluatively-
consistent (Tesser, 1978) set of supporting experiences, affec-
tive reactions and beliefs.
Attitudes as schemata
. An attitude judgment can be considered an
evaluative inference about oneself, in that it represents a judgment
about one's orientation toward a particular object(s). In this
sense, the attitude construct has much in common with self-theories.
Recent developments in the study of the self have identified self-
theories with cognitive structures called schemata. According to
Markus (1977), schemata "represent the way the self has been differ-
entiated and articulated in memory" (p. 64). They are cognitive
representations of personal characteristics, which can be a function
of a specific event or a function of the repeated categorization and
evaluation of one's behavior.
From the standpoint of the present analysis, it is useful to
consider the attitudes which are derived from supporting cognitions
to be a kind of self-schema. Research on schemata is generally con-
ducted from a cognitive perspective and it employs dependent
variables such as reaction time and recall. It may therefore provide
some insight into the information processing functions of attitudes.
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Research on self-schemata generally identifies those subjects
with a schema along a particular trait dimension (schematics) and
those without (aschematics). Then both groups engage in a task which
utilizes their self-knowledge about this attribute. The criteria
employed to differentiate schematics and aschematics have generally
been limited to self-reports of extremity in a particular trait, self-
reports of the importance of the trait, or simply ratings of whether
the trait is self-descriptive (Markus, 1977; Rogers, Rogers, &
Kirker, 1979). The research results indicate that schematics are
faster at deciding whether schema-related information correctly
describes them and they make these decisions with more confidence
and less difficulty, they can provide more behavioral examples to
support their relevant self-perception, they predict a greater
likelihood of engaging in consistent behavior along the dimension,
and they are less likely to believe fictitious feedback about the
particular attribute (Kuiper & Rogers, 1979; Markus, 1977; Rogers,
Kuiper, & Kirker, 1977). Other possible functions of schemata can
perhaps be inferred from research that has employed a similar ex-
perimental paradigm, but has not invoked the schema concept. For
example, Bern and Allen (1974) found that subjects who initially
reported their behavior stable along a particular trait dimension,
compared with those who reported themselves unstable, subsequently
showed higher correlations between their relevant behaviors and a
description of themselves in terms of the attribute. Similarly, in
a study on attitudes, Norman (1975) found that subjects with
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evaluatively consistent affective and cognitive attitudinal components
were more likely to act in accord with their stated opinion than sub-
jects without consistent components.
Several theorists have conceptualized attitudes in terms of a
cognitive structure (Abelson, 1976; Tesser, 1978). Abelson (1976)
has argued that "true" attitudes develop in relation to domains that
one has personally experienced, and may take the form of social
scripts. Tesser (1978) provides evidence to suggest that thinking
about an attitude object for which one has a schema can polarize
evaluation of the object.
The cognitive theories previously discussed may provide more
detailed insight into the characteristics of schematic attitudes.
Extrapolating from a network model of memory, it may be that
attitudes which function as schemata are represented in memory as
abstract concepts, linked to a substructure of more concrete concepts,
which consist of related beliefs and previous experiences. As sug-
gested by the research on schemata, such attitudes may affect the en-
coding, storage, and/or retrieval of relevant information. The
distinction made previously between a context-derived attitude, based
on contemporaneous cues, and a memory-derived attitude, reflecting
detailed cognitive support, can perhaps be equated with the absence
and presence of a cognitive schema. The finding that subjects who
are aschematic on a particular dimension are relatively susceptible
to fictitious feedback about their standing on the dimension (Markus,
1977) is consistent with this perspective. Aschematics would be
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expected to utilize fictitious feedback along wxth other contemporane-
ous cues to formulate their judgment.
The Present Research
The present research explores the postulated differences in
cognitive support underlying memory- and context-derived attitudes,
and examines how differences in informational content underlying
attitude judgments are related to the impact of recent behavioral
incidents on these judgments and to their susceptibility to
persuasion.
According to the present analysis, perceivers expressing
memory-derived attitudes may be able to retrieve from memory previous
actions, beliefs, and affective reactions relevant to the attitude
object, whereas those indicating context-derived attitudes probably
do not have easy access to such detailed information. If asked to
indicate their beliefs about the attitude object by generating a
list of its characteristics (cf. Fishbein & Ajzen, 1975), or if asked
to indicate their recall of previous experiences with the object by
listing their prior actions in regard to it, people who derive their
attitude from contextual cues may experience difficulty providing the
required information, whereas those with memory-derived attitudes may
have data of both types readily available. Consequently, if only a
short amount of time is provided for generating these lists,
individuals with memory-derived attitudes may be more successful at
this task.
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Susceptibility to persuasion. Perceivers deriving attitude judgments
from memory may be little affected by persuasive messages when
compared with those who do not have this basis of support. According
to a cognitive respose view of persuasion (Petty & Cacioppo,
1979), message persuasiveness is a function of the nature of the
thoughts recipients generate in response to the communication.
Attitudes derived from supporting cognitions may be little affected
by counterattitudinal messages because information is available for
the effective generation of counterarguments to the material
presented. Individuals who commonly derive their attitude on an
issue from contemporaneous cues may be less resistant to persuasion
because they have little information available for counterarguing
the message. Such message recipients may generate primarily favor-
able thoughts in reaction to the message. Consistent with the
definition of context-derived attitudes, the judgments may be de-
rived, at least in part, from the position suggested in the message.
Intrinsic motivation . The degree of cognitive support underlying an
attitude may also affect whether perceivers' judgments are dependent
on recent or salient behavioral incidents. In intrinsic motivation
research, recent behaviors appear to have a sizeable impact on
attitudes. However, attitudes with detailed cognitive support may be
less affected by recent behavior because the behavior is only one
piece of information on which the judgment is based. Some support for
this analysis is provided by a study on counterattitudinal behavior
(Snyder & Ebbesen, 1972). In this experiment, subjects who were
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asked to organize their thoughts about the attitude issue before they
engaged in a relevant behavior did not rely heavily on the behavior
when subsequently indicating their attitude. Other subjects who did
not organize their thoughts inferred attitudes consistent with the
behavior. Snyder and Ebbesen (1972) suggest that when a person has
recently formulated an opinion on an issue, he or she simply supplies
the same opinion to the current assessment. Although previous judg-
ments may certainly be employed as a basis for present opinions it is
also likely that thinking about their position encouraged subjects to
retrieve and organize supportive beliefs and affective reactions.
Subjects may have relied partially on this information when expressing
their opinions.
CHAPTER II
METHOD
First Experimental Session
Subjects. A total of 166 University of Massachusetts psychology
students participated for extra credit. Seven of these were
eliminated because they did not complete the second-half of the
experiment.
Procedure
.
Subjects were recruited to participate in a two-session
experiment on attitudes and opinions. It was explained that a
variety of instruments would be used to assess participants'
opinions on social issues. Subjects participated in groups ranging
from ten to fifteen.
Subjects completed a questionnaire assessing their opinions
and other responses to seven issues, including the message topic,
preservation of the environment (see below). They then responded
to a questionnaire which elicited their beliefs and their previous
behaviors in regard to five of the issues, including preservation
of the environment. Finally, subjects indicated whether they had
participated in various organizations, and provided background
information (e.g., sex, class). Subjects returned approximately
one week later to participate in one of the two experiments com-
prising the second experimental session.
28
29
Measuring instruments
.
Opinions. Subjects indicated their initial opinions on the topic
"preservation of the environment" on a 15-point scale anchored by
"Very favorable" and "Very unfavorable."
Self-reports of previous reactions
. On 15-point scales, sub-
jects indicated how frequently in the past few years they had thought
about preservation of the environment, taken some action in regard
to it, and had positive or negative feelings about it. To assess
subjects' knowledge about preservation, they were asked to rate on
a 15-point scale how well-informed they were. They were also asked
to rate how frequently in the past few years they had talked with
others about the topic, read articles and books on it, taken
relevant courses, and watched TV programs on it. Ratings of these
specific information-gathering behaviors were averaged, and each
subject was assigned a mean score. Subjects' ratings of how well-
informed they were proved to be highly correlated with this mean
score (r = .71), and the two measures were summed into an index
representing subjects' knowledge about the topic.
Involvement . Subjects rated on two 15-point scales how person-
ally important and how involved they were in preservation of the en-
vironment. Responses to these two items were highly correlated
(r = .62), and were summed into an index representing degree of involve-
ment in the issue.
Belief retrieval . To determine the ease with which subjects could
retrieve attitudinally-relevant cognitions, they were asked to list
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on a questionnaire the characteristics and facts they believed to
be true about preservation of the environment. The opinion topic
was listed at the top of the page, and six boxes were provided
underneath. Subjects were told to write only one belief in each
box. Several examples of beliefs about noncritical topics were
provided. Subjects were told that if they did not have six beliefs
to list about a topic, they should leave the boxes blank. Subjects
were then given two minutes to list their beliefs about the topic.
The number of discrete beliefs each subject listed about preserva-
tion of the environment was judged by two independent raters (r =
.91). In addition, to explore the relations between opinion change
on preservation, the retrieval of topic-relevant beliefs, and the
retrieval of beliefs on other topics, the number of discrete be-
liefs subjects listed concerning psychological research was judged
by two raters (r = .94).
Behavior retrieval
. Subjects' recall of attitudinally-relevant
behaviors was assessed in a manner similar to the belief retrieval
task. Subjects were asked to list specific instances of times when
they had engaged in actions related to the topic. The number of
discrete behaviors each subject listed about preservation of the
environment and about psychological research was judged by two
independent raters (rs = .89 and .90, respectively).
Group membership . In order to provide information on the con-
current validity of the belief and behavior retrieval tasks, sub-
jects were asked to indicate whether they belonged to environmental
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organizations which would provide them with relevant experiences.
Second Experimenta l Session: Susceptibility to Persuasion
Subjects. A total of 65 subjects returned in groups of about 12 to
complete this second session.
Procedure. In this session, subjects again expected to indicate their
opinions in a variety of formats. The rationale, adapted from Jones
and Brehm (1967), for preceding the opinion questionnaire by a
persuasive message was that being exposed to someone else's opinion
and the arguments he or she uses to support this opinion gets people
in the "right frame of mind to be critical and careful about evaluating
their own opinions" and therefore makes it possible to measure their
opinions more accurately.
The experimenter next gave each subject a handout containing
further information about the persuasive message. The handout ex-
plained that each subject would read a transcript of an interview
(actually hypothetical) that had been tape-recorded as part of an
opinion survey conducted on campus. Participants in this survey,
including students, faculty, staff, and visitors, had (supposedly)
been asked to give an opinion on an issue and then support that
opinion with evidence. The handout stated that over 100 different
interviews covering 10 topics were available and that, by random
selection, almost everyone would get a different interview to
read. The handout also stated that participants may read an inter-
view in which the opinion expressed was quite different from their
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own since the interviews represented a wide sampling of opinions.
The experimenter then gave each subject an interview transcript,
which contained the persuasive message. The transcript began with
an interviewer asking an interviewee (source), Jim H.
, for some
background information. Jim H. was portrayed as a graduate student
in biology who was very interested in the issue of environmental
preservation. In response to the interviewer's question, Jim
stated that, "I am not very strongly in favor of current efforts to
preserve our environment ... we have to recognize that preservation
has negative effects."" Jim then went on to state four arguments
against preserving the environment: (a) preservation has a negative
impact on the economy, (b) the energy problem justifies lowering en-
vironmental standards to allow the burning of coal, (c) the preserved
land is needed for housing and for farm land, and (d) it is not
necessary to preserve the environment because it is possible to clean
up pollution.
After allowing about six minutes for reading the transcripts,
the experimenter distributed a questionnaire on which subjects
stated their opinions on a variety of social issues. Two of these
issues were identical to the ones subjects rated earlier. One topic
concerned preservation of the environment. Next, the experimenter
explained that she was also interested in subjects' reactions to
the interviews. Subjects completed a questionnaire which elicited
their thoughts about the interview transcript, along with other
responses (see below).
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Measuring instruments
.
Opinions. Subjects' final opinions on preservation of the en-
vironment were assessed on the opinion scale described above.
Cognitive response measures. Subjects were given two-and-a-half
minutes to list their thoughts about what the communicator said in
the message. The questionnaire, similar to that used by Petty and
Cacioppo (1979), listed the instructions at the top of the page, with
seven boxes underneath. Two independent raters judged the number
of positive (r =
.93), negative (r = .80), and neutral (r =
.53)
thoughts each subject produced.
Perceptions of the communicator
. Subjects rated the communi-
cator on ten fifteen-point bipolar scales, with positive poles,
consistent, honest, sincere, non-opportunistic, non-manipulative,
non-compliant, open-minded, unbiased, objective, and likeable.
Message comprehension
.
Subjects were asked to summarize each
argument the communicator used to support his position, and two
independent judges determined the number correctly recalled
(r = .88). Subjects were also asked to write down the overall
position the communicator took in the interview. Only two subjects
were not able to correctly recall the message position.
Suspicion . At the end of the experiment, subjects were asked
to describe in their own words the purpose of the study, and these
responses were coded for suspicion of persuasive intent. Because
elimination of the seven suspicious subjects had little effect on
the results, they were retained in the analysis.
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Second Experimental Session: Intrinsic Motivation
Subjects. A total of 94 subjects participated in this second session.
One of these was eliminated because she declined to deliver the
persuasive message. Three more were eliminated because they were
suspicious of the cover story; they did not believe they would deliver
the persuasive arguments.
Procedure
.
Subjects reported individually to a second session concerned
with attitude change. The apparent purpose of this study was to deter-
mine the optimal number of arguments to use in a persuasive message.
The procedure was adapted from an experiment by Kiesler,
Nisbett, and Zanna (1969). Subjects were asked to present some
arguments, previously prepared by the experimenter, to two people on
campus. It was explained that a number of students were needed as
communicators so that the specific personality characteristics of a
single communicator did not affect the results. Subjects believed
that after presenting the arguments they would ask the message
recipients whether they were willing to sign a petition in favor of
the message position. Subjects expected to rehearse before leaving
to conduct the task.
After describing the purpose and procedure of the study, the
experimenter (ostensibly) randomly assigned one of the topics sub-
jects had rated in the first session. In reality, all subjects
were asked to argue in favor of environmental preservation.
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At this point it was mentioned to half of the subjects
(Reward condition) that they would receive $5.00 for agreeing to
participate in this phase of the experiment. The money was placed
in front of the subjects and remained visible throughout the rest
of the session. Half of the subjects were not offered a monetary
reward for their participation (No reward condition ). Subjects were
then asked if they agreed to present the persuasive message.
The experimenter then remarked that before the subjects
start to practice the communication, it would probably be a good
idea to get a measure of how they felt right now about the issue.
After indicating their opinions, subjects responded to a question-
naire assessing their explanations for agreeing to present the
message
.
After completing the questionnaire, subjects were asked if
they believed they would present the message. They were then de-
briefed and excused. Subjects in the reward condition received the
five dollars.
Measuring instruments .
Opinions . Subjects indicated their opinions on preservation
of the environment on the opinion scale described above.
Attributions . On 15-point scales, subjects rated the importance
of several reasons for agreeing to persuade others to sign the
petition: (a) receiving experimental credit or payment, (b) con-
vincing others about a topic the subject really believed in, and
(c) any other reason the subject cared to mention.
CHAPTER III
RESULTS
First Experimental Session
The number of beliefs subjects indicated ranged from 2 to 7
,
with an average of 3.75, and the number of behaviors ranged from
0 to 6, with an average of 2.83. Median splits were performed on
both variables (medians = 3.70 and 2.73, for beliefs and behaviors,
respectively) and Number of Beliefs Retrieved from Memory (few vs.
many) X Number of Behaviors Retrieved (few vs. many) analyses of
2
variance were calculated, along with appropriate contrasts.
Self-perception of past experiences and involvement
. As expected,
subjects* perceptions of their past experiences and their involvement
concerning preservation of the environment corresponded to the num-
ber of beliefs and the number of behaviors they listed. As shown in
table 1, subjects who listed many behaviors, compared to those who
listed few, rated that they had thought more about preservation,
F(l,157) = 14.31, p_ < .001, had engaged in more action, F ( 1 , 157 ) =
12.26, £ < .001, and had experienced more feelings, F ( 1,157) =
15.67, p_ < .001. In addition, subjects who listed many behaviors,
compared with those who listed few, indicated that they knew more
about the topic, F( 1 , 157 ) = 20.15, p_ < .001, and perceived them-
selves to be more involved, F( 1,157) = 21.80, £ < .001. Although
36
37
T3
01
>
Ol
•H
S»4
—>
<u >^
s-l 1-1
o
oo E
S-l OJ
o S
•H
> S
03 o
X! u
01 4hX
>%
s
CO
T3
>
01
U
o
00 0)
o
>
03
X!
0)X
3
0)
fe
£
ClQ o
4-i u
0) 4-4
•H
XI >»
01 0) S-lX > o
o> £
•H
a S-l E
ea 4->
23 Oi
S-l
s
o
w u
4-i 4-1
OJ
•H "O >»H 01 S-l
01 > oX 01 E
•H 01
3 S-l B
OJ 4-4
01
S-l
s
fs ro
01 4-4.
•H
r—1 X) >>
0) 0) S-lX > O
01 E
>% •H 01
d S-l B
4-1
01
S-l
E
w o
4h S-i
01 4-1
•H
r-
1
>>
01 01 S-lX > o
Ol £
•H 01
S-l s
fe
ret
00
m
i—
i
co
oo
QO
CT\
CM
OO
m
r—i
-J-
CM
m
CO
CM
o
CM
o
CM
O
m
m
CM
CM
CM
CM
CM
CM
O
CM
00
W
00
X! 3 3
00 o •H
3 •H i—
1
4-4 o 4-1 4-> 4-1 0)
O th O ac O fe nt
>^ >> >^ 4-1 01 4-1 0)
a co u w u co O oo O g
a 3 3 3 3 3 01
<v O 0) o Ol o 0) 0) 4-1 >
3 •H 3 •H 3 •H 0) i—
1
3 1—1
cr1 > > cr > S-l 0) o
Ol 01 01 o> OJ 0) 00 o 4-1 >
S-l S-l S-l S-l s^ S-i Ol 3 X
fe a, fe Oh fe Oi a J* w •H
0) 4-1
T3 o
3
c<3 3
o
*> H
3 4-1
O CO
•H >
4-> S-i
CJ 0)
CO oo
Ol
S-4
4-1 OhX
CO 00
3 3
o •r-4
XI 3
If $_i
0)
4-1 O
3
01 O
3 o
a1
Ol 4J
S-4 3
4-4 0)
£
01 Ol
S-l >
o 1—
1
£ o
>
Ol 3
4-> •H
CO
CJ 0)
•H S-l
T3 O
3 £H
00 3
S-l CO
Ol
X
- 01
3 00
3 T3
01
S-i r-H
0)
x: o
00 3
•H
S-l
01
4-»
Ol CO
4-> 0)
o S-i
z 00
38
no significant effects on these variables were obtained for the
beliefs factor, differences between subjects who listed few beliefs
and those who listed many were in the predicted direction.
Group membership. Participants who belonged to environmental groups
such as the Sierra Club and the Audubon Society listed more behaviors
(19 listed many behaviors vs. 6 listed few) than participants who did
not belong to such organizations (70 listed many behaviors vs. 62
listed few), x2 = 4.52, p_ < .05. Parallel results were obtained for
the belief factor, although they were not significant.
First Experiment: Susceptibility to Persuasion
The hypotheses were explored by a 2 (few vs. many beliefs) X
2 (few vs. many behaviors) design. Because analyses including sub-
ject sex as an additional variable yielded no differences between
males' and females' persuasibility and no systematic differences
across other measures, this variable is not included in the following
analyses
.
Opinions
. Analysis of covariance was conducted on the postopinions
,
with preopinions as the covariate. That the covariance analysis was
appropriately conducted was suggested by (a) the test for homogeneity
of the covariate regression coefficients indicated that the co-
efficients did not differ across experimental conditions, and (b)
the covariate accounted for a significant amount of variance in the
analysis on postopinions, F(l,6l) = 6.97, p_ < .02, f| = .34.
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Analysis of variance indicated that preoptions were more pro-
environment in the many (M = 14.15) than few behaviors conditions
(M = 13.22, p < .05), and that preopinions (M = 13.71) differed
significantly from postopinions (M = 11.85, p_ < .01)
.
Opinion means, which are the postopinion scores adjusted on
the basis of the analysis of covariance, appear in table 2.
Analysis of these data indicated that, as predicted, subjects who
listed many behaviors changed their opinions less in response to
the persuasive message than those who listed few behaviors,
F(l,6l) = 7.91, £ < .01, n = -47. Also, those who listed a large
number of beliefs changed their opinions less than those who
indicated few beliefs, F(l,6l) = 4.43, £ < .05, q = .34.
The above analysis does not reveal whether subjects' attitude
change was a function of the retrieval of topic-specific information
(i.e., beliefs and behaviors concerning preservation of the environ-
ment) or whether it represented a general cognitive style which
provided easy or difficult access to relevant information about the
self. To explore these possibilities, subjects' retrieval of beliefs
and behaviors on a second topic, psychological research, was employed
as a predictor of opinion change on preservation of the environment.
The analysis suggested that the opinion change may have been a func-
tion of topic-specific retrieval: No effects were obtained on the
belief measure. Although subjects who indicated few behaviors
concerning psychological research became less proenvironment
(M = 11.39) than those who indicated many (M = 12.66, £ < .02),
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TABLE 2
MEAN POSTOPINIONS: PERSUASION EXPERIMENT
Number of
beliefs retrieved
from memory
Number of behaviors retrieved from memorv
Few behaviors Many behaviors
Few beliefs 10.32 12.08
Many beliefs 11.67 12.74
Note: Means are adjusted postopinion scores on a 15-point scale
on which higher numbers indicate greater favorability toward
preservation of the environment.
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»rs
this effect could be due to the correlation between the number of
behaviors listed about the environment and about psychological
research (r = .45, p_ < .001). Indeed, when a stepwise regression
analysis was conducted, which predicted opinion change from behavio,
concerning psychological research after the variance due to behaviors
concerning preservation was removed, the research measure was no
longer signficant (p_ > .20).
Self-perceptions as predictors of opinion change
. A hierarchical
regression analysis was performed to determine whether subjects' self-
perceptions significantly contributed to the prediction of opinion
change, after the variance due to the belief and behavior retrieval
factors was removed. The self-perception variables proved to be
marginal or significant predictors when each was entered into a
separate regression equation, after the belief and behavior factors:
thought (B = .19, p_ < .10), behavior (B = .29, p_ < .01), feelings
(B = .36, p_ < .001), involvement (B = .50, p_ < .001), and knowl-
edge (B = .21, £ < .07)
.
A hierarchical regression analysis was also computed by first
entering each self-perception measure into a separate equation and
then entering the belief and behavior retrieval variables. The
analyses revealed that the belief and behavior factors remained
significant predictors of opinion change (p_s < .05), except that
when knowledge was included in the equation, the behavior factor
was only marginally significant (p_ < .08).
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Informational responses to the communicator's message
.
Cognitive responses. Subjects' thoughts about the communicator's
message are presented in table 3. Subjects who indicated many be-
haviors, compared with those who listed few, generated a smaller num-
ber of favorable thoughts, F(l,6l) = 5.86, £ < .05, q = -33, and a
greater number of counterarguments, F(l,6l) = 8.10, p_ < .01,
H = .39. No effects were obtained on the analysis of neutral
thoughts
.
Evidence for these responses as mediators of opinion change
was provided by the correlations between favorable thoughts and
adjusted postopinions (r = -
. 23
, p_ < . 08) , and between counter-
arguments and adjusted postopinions (r =
.41, p_ < .01). The
mediational role of these responses was further explored through
hierarchical regression. When counterarguments were entered into
the analysis before the retrieval factors, the beliefs factor be-
came only a marginally significant predictor of opinion change, '
F(l,59) = 3.04, £ < .10, and the behaviors factor became
a less effective predictor, F(l,59) = 4.56, p_ < .05. The favorable
thoughts measure was not a significant predictor of opinion change
in the regression analysis.
Message comprehension
.
Analysis of the number of message argu-
ments subjects recalled yielded no effects, and the correlation
between the number recalled and the adjusted postopinions was not
significant.
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Perception of the communicator
. A factor analysis (varxmax rotation)
of the source ratings yielded three rotated factors. The factors,
which accounted for 28.9%, 18.2%, and 10.8% of the variance, were
labeled "Unbiased" (open-minded, unbiased), "Sincere" (honest,
sincere, likeable), and "Objective" (objective, unbiased), respec-
tively. Factor scores were computed for each subject and then
treated by analysis of variance. The source was judged less
biased by subjects who listed few beliefs (M =
.40), compared
with those who listed many (M =
-.27), F(l,6l) = 8.03, £ < .01.
In addition, the source was perceived as more sincere by subjects
who listed few behaviors (M =
.33), compared with those who listed
many (M = -.29), F(l,6l) = 7.22, £ < .01. No effects were obtained
in the analysis on the objective factor.
The consistent, nonopportunistic
,
nonmanipulative , and non-
compliant scales, which failed to load highly on any of these
factors, were analyzed separately. Only the analysis of the non-
manipulative variable yielded significant effects. Subjects who
listed few beliefs perceived the source to be more nonmanipulative
(M = 8.56) than those who listed many beliefs (M = 7.27),
F(l,6l) = 4.89, £ < .05.
Subjects tended to change their opinions to the extent that
they perceived the source as unbiased and nonmanipulative (rs =
-.24 and -.26, respectively, ps < .06). However, because these
perceptions were not significant predictors of opinion change when
entered into a hierarchical regression analysis before the retrieval
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factors, perceptions did not mediate opinion change.
Second Experiment: Intrinsic Motivation
The hypotheses were explored by a 2 (few vs. many beliefs) X
2 (few vs. many behaviors) X 2 (reward vs. no reward) design and
appropriate contrasts. Because analyses including subject sex as
an additional variable yielded no differences between males' and
females' persuasibility and no systematic differences across other
measures, this variable is not included in the following analyses.
Opinions
.
Similar to Experiment 1, analysis of covariance was con-
ducted on the postopinions, with preopinions as the covariate. Again,
the test for homogeneity of the covariate regression coefficients
indicated that the coefficients did not differ across experimental
conditions, and the covariate accounted for a significant amount of
variance in the prediction of opinion change, F(l , 79) = 43.08,
p_ < .001, r| = .53. Analysis of variance indicated that preopinions
did not vary across experimental conditions, and that preopinions
(M = 14.03) differed significantly from postopinions (M = 12.81,
p_ < .05).
Opinion means, which are the postopinion scores adjusted on the
basis of the analysis of covariance, appear in table 4. The results
replicated the findings typically obtained in self-perception
research: Subjects who received a reward changed their opinions to
be less favorable toward preservation of the environment than sub-
jects in the no reward conditions, F( 1 , 79 ) = 7.66, p_ < .01, q = .19.
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TABLE 4
MEAN POSTOPINIONS: INTRINSIC MOTIVATION EXPERIMENT
Few behaviors Many behaviors
retrieved from memory retrieved from memo
Number of
beliefs retrieved
from memory Reward No reward Reward No rewar
Few
beliefs 11..47 13.,15 13..21 13..52
Many
beliefs 11 .43 12.,66 13,.26 13..14
Not : Means are adjusted postopinion scores on a 15-point scale
on which higher numbers indicate greater favorability toward
preservation of the environment.
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Further, the results provided support for the present hypotheses.
Subjects who indicated few behaviors showed more change than those
who indicated many behaviors, F(l,79) = 17.22, p_ < .001, q = .41.
Also, a Reward X Number of Behaviors interaction, F(l , 79) = 6.87,
p_ < .02, n = -21, indicated that the difference between the reward
and the no reward conditions was significant for subjects who listed
few behaviors, F(l,79) = 17.59, p_ < .001, but not for those who
listed many (F < 1). Post hoc comparisons among means, by the
Sheffe method, revealed that the opinion means of rewarded subjects
who indicated few behaviors and few beliefs or many beliefs differed
significantly (p_ < .05) from all other opinion means.
Similar to Experiment 1, to determine whether subjects' attitude
change was indeed a function of the retrieval of topic-specific
information, subjects' retrieval of beliefs and behaviors on
psychological research was employed as a predictor of opinion change
on preservation of the environment. Neither beliefs nor behaviors
concerning psychological research proved to be predictors of
opinion change (Fs < 1).
Self-perceptions as predictors of opinion change . As in
Experiment 1, a hierarchical regression analysis was performed to
determine whether subjects' self-perceptions contributed to the
prediction of opinion change, after the variance due to the belief
and behavior retrieval factors, the reward manipulation, and the
Reward X Number of Behaviors interaction was removed. Each of
the self-perceptions was a significant predictor: thoughts
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(B
- .26, E < .01), behavior (B = .30, g < .001), feelings (B =
•28, £ < .01), involvement (B = .36, p_ < .001), and knowledge
(B =
. 25
, p_ < .01)
.
A step-wise regression analysis was also computed by first
entering each of the self-perception measures into separate equations
along with the reward manipulation, and then adding the belief and
behavior retrieval variables and the Reward X Behaviors interaction
in the second step. The analyses revealed that in all equations the
behavior factor and the Reward X Behaviors interaction were
significant (p_ < .05) or marginally significant (p_ < .10) predictors
of opinion change.
Attributions
.
As shown in table 5, subjects who were rewarded
attributed the decision to deliver the persuasive arguments more to
the reward than subjects who did not receive the reward, F(l ,79) =
3.08, p_ < .09, 0 = -20.
Subjects who listed many beliefs attributed the decision
marginally more to belief in preservation than subjects who listed
few beliefs, F(l,79) = 3.62, £ < .06, q = .23 (see table 5). In
addition, a Reward X Number of Behaviors interaction, F ( 1,79) =
8.20, £ < .01, r| = .29, revealed that in the few behaviors groups,
subjects who were not rewarded attributed the decision more to their
belief in the issue than those who received a reward, F ( 1 , 79 ) =
3.81, £ < .05, but in the many behaviors groups, rewarded subjects made
a stronger attribution to their belief than not rewarded subjects,
F(l,79) = 3.62, £ < .06.
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Evidence that attribution to belief mediated opinion change was
provided by a hierarchical regression analysis. When attribution to
belief was entered into the analysis before the behavior retrieval
factor, the reward manipulation, and the Reward X Behaviors inter-
action, the behaviors factor was no longer a significant predictor
of opinion change, F( 1 , 82) = 2 . 63
, p_ < . 12 , and the reward manipu-
lation and the interaction were only marginally significant,
F(l,82) = 3.51, and F(l,82) = 3.62, respectively, p_s < .07.
Attribution to reward was not a significant predictor of opinion
change in the regression analysis.
CHAPTER IV
DISCUSSION
According to the proposed distinction between memory- and
context-derived attitudes, individuals who can retrieve attitudinaIr-
relevant information from memory will employ this information, in
preference to contextual cues, to assess how favorable they are
toward the attitude object. In contrast, individuals who do not
have easy access to such information in memory will rely relatively
more on contextual cues and recent behavior to assess their attitude.
New information that counters initial opinions was expected to have
a greater impact on context- than memory-derived attitudes because
context-derived attitudes are drawn more from the data that is
currently available and less from prior experiences and beliefs.
The present research appears to have been an appropriate site
for exploring differences between memory- and context-derived
attitudes. The distinction between these two attitudes was opera-
tionalized in terms of whether few or many beliefs and few or many
behaviors relevant to preservation of the environment were indicated
in the listing tasks. For the retrieval of beliefs and behaviors
to reflect this distinction, they should correspond to other measures
which reflect access to attitudinally-relevant cognitions and prior
experiences. Indeed, subjects who listed many behaviors, compared
with those who listed few, perceived themselves to have experienced
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raore thought, action, and feelings about preservation and to be more
knowledgeable and involved. Results for the belief measure were
similar, though nonsignificant. Further, subjects who belonged to
environmental groups such as the Sierra Club or the Audubon Society
indicated more behaviors than those not members of such groups.
Impact of Belief and Behavior Retrieval on Opinions
Persuasion experiment. Subjects, who were generally in favor of
preservation of the environment, were presented with a persuasive
message that argued against preservation. Those who retrieved from
memory many beliefs relevant to preservation, compared with few
beliefs, and many behaviors, compared with few behaviors, showed less
opinion change.
Consistent with a cognitive response analysis of persuasion
(Petty & Cacciopo, 1979), the cognitive responses appeared to be
mediators of the effects of belief and behavior retrieval on opinion
change. In the experiment, the cognitive responses produced were a
function of the extent to which subjects could retrieve relevant
experiences from memory. Subjects who retrieved many behaviors
produced thoughts favorable to the message and more counterarguments
than those who retrieved few behaviors. The cognitive responses were
then found to be appropriately related to opinion change. Both
favorable thoughts and counterarguments were significantly correlated
with change. Further evidence that these responses mediated ac-
ceptance of the persuasive message was suggested by a hierarchical
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regression analysis predicting opinion change. When the counter-
arguments variable was entered first into the equation, the factor
representing belief retrieval was no longer a significant predictor,
and the factor representing behavior retrieval became a less effec-
tive predictor. It thus appears that attitudes which were derived
from beliefs and behaviors retrieved from memory were little affected
by the persuasive message because information was available for the
effective production of counterarguments to the material presented.
Perceptions of the communicator yielded effects similar to the
cognitive response measures, although perceptions were not clearly
mediators of opinion change. The source was perceived as more
biased and manipulative by subjects who retrieved many, than few,
beliefs, and was 'perceived as less sincere by subjects who retrieved
many, than few, behaviors. Although perceptions of bias and
manipulation were correlated with opinion change, regression analyses
suggested that they did not mediate the effects of belief and behavior
retrieval on persuasion.
Intrinsic motivation experiment
.
Subjects were either rewarded or
not rewarded for deciding to deliver arguments in favor of preserva-
tion of the environment to students on campus. That the reward was
successfully manipulated was suggested by the fact that rewarded sub-
jects attributed their decision marginally more to the reward than
not rewarded subjects.
The opinion change of subjects who retrieved few behaviors con-
formed to the results typically obtained in self-perception research:
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Subjects who were rewarded for decxdxng to argue in favor of preserva-
tion inferred a less positive attitude than subjects who were not
rewarded for their decision. In contrast, subjects who retrieved
.any
behaviors showed little opinion change in either reward or no reward
conditions. These results suggest that when little cognitive support
underlies an attitude, perceivers' judgments are highly affected by
recent behavioral incidents. However, attitudes with detailed
cognitive support are less affected by recent behavior, most likely
because the behavior is only one piece of information on which the
judgment is based.
Subjects' explanations for their decision to present the
arguments supported the attribution interpretation of opinion
change. It should be recalled that intrinsic attributions reflect
an explanation in terms of one's belief in an issue, whereas ex-
trinsic attributions reflect explanations in terms of cues indepen-
dent of the attitude object, such as the reward in the present ex-
periment. That in the few behaviors groups, rewarded subjects,
compared with those not rewarded, made a less intrinsic attribution
was indicated by the fact that they attributed their decision rela-
tively less to belief in preservation. This finding parallels the
difference obtained on opinion change between rewarded and not re-
warded subjects. In contrast, in the many behaviors groups, differ-
ences between rewarded and not rewarded subjects were unexpectedly
in the opposite direction: Those who received a reward, compared
with those who did not, attributed the decision more to their
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belief. This result is not reflected in the opinxon change findings.
The extent to which subjects explained their decision in terms
of belief in preservation appeared to mediate opinion change. A
hierarchical regression analysis indicated that when attribution to
belief was entered first into an equation predicting opinion change,
the behavior retrieval factor was no longer a significant predictor,
and the reward manipulation and the Reward X Behaviors interaction
became only marginally significant predictors. Thus, the reward
and the retrieval of prior experiences affected opinion change
primarily through the mediation of subjects' explanations. Sub-
jects who had access to relevant experiences incorporated this
information into their explanations and inferred a relatively
favorable opinion. In contrast, the mediation of opinion change
for subjects without access to relevant experiences conformed to
the hypothesized process by which attitudes are inferred from be-
haviors. After identifying the plausible cause(s) for their
decision, subjects who were not rewarded, compared with those who
were, made attributions more to belief in preservation and subse-
quently inferred a more favorable attitude.
These mediational findings support the self-perception analysis
that when internal cues, such as prior experiences relevant to the
attitude object, are not accessible, attitudes are inferred from
behavior and the context in which it occurs (Bern, 1972). The present
analysis extends this theory by providing an a priori means of deter-
mining when attitudes will reflect primarily experiences retrieved
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from memory or primarily explanations of recent or salient behavior.
The attribution findings are also informative concerning
subjects' access to their causal analysis. The fact that subjects
were able to report on the attributional factor that mediated
opinion change suggests that they may have had access to higher
order processing. However, it has been argued that people report
on such processing not because they have access to it, but because
the reports reflect a priori theories of causality (Nisbett & Wilson,
1977). Reports of processing are thought to be accurate only when
intuitive theories of causality correspond to actual analyses.
Thus it is unclear whether subjects in the present research truly
had access to their processing.
Other Issues
The analyses consistently yielded significant differences due
to the number of behaviors listed but only in a few instances did
the beliefs factor yield significant effects. It is possible that
the extent to which relevant behaviors can be retrieved is, in
general, a more important contributor to opinions than the retrieval
of relevant beliefs. Indeed, it has been argued that attitudes
based primarily on information obtained through indirect experiences
with the attitude object (i.e., information acquired second hand)
are relatively unclear and not confidently held (Fazio & Zanna, in
press). Attitudes which are based on the information obtained
through prior action, however, are thought to be well-defined and
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held confidently.
Another possible reason why the beliefs measure is a le
effective predictor of opinions than the behaviors measure is bee
it may be a less perfect indicator of subjects' retrieval. That
subjects listed on the average a greater number of beliefs than be-
haviors could suggest that they were not only indicating beliefs
stored in memory but were also generating new beliefs during the
listing task. The act of retrieving beliefs may have spontaneously
resulted in newly perceived relations between preservation and other
constructs stored in memory. The retrieval of behaviors, however,
may be less likely to generate newly perceived instances because
recall of specific examples of previous experiences is required.
The beliefs measure may therefore have contained a greater degree
of error, which would make it a less effective predictor of opinion
change in the analysis. Other means of operationalizing the belief
and behavior constructs, however, may find that access to both is
equally important in determining opinions.
Self-perceptions and the retrieval factors . Analysis of the self-
perception measures suggested that subjects were informed about the
degree of organization of their beliefs and prior experiences. Self-
perceptions of retrievable information were systematically related
to the belief and behavior retrieval factors, which represented
relatively direct measures of access. For example, subjects who
retrieved many, rather than few, behaviors considered themselves
to have experienced more thought and to be more knowledgeable.
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Although it has been argued that people often do not have access to
cognitive processing (Nisbett & Wilson, 1977), subjects in the present
study appeared to be aware of this processing to the extent that they
reported accurately on the stored information.
Self-perceptions were not based entirely on access to
attitudinally-relevant information. A hierarchical regression analysis
revealed that even though the retrieval factors and the self-
perception measures accounted for some of the same variance in pre-
dicting opinion change, they were also independent contributors.
Thus, self-perceptions were derived from information (such as
temporary mood states) which was related to opinion change indepen-
dent of the retrieval of beliefs and prior experiences.
Comparisons between the effectiveness of self-perceptions and
retrieval factors as predictors of opinion change suggest that, in
general, the retrieval factors yield the results which are most
consistent with the hypotheses. Although self-perceptions,
especially behaviors, feelings, and involvement, often yielded
effects greater in magnitude than the retrieval factors, the
results of analyses that incorporated self-perceptions instead of
these factors did not strictly conform to the hypotheses. In the
intrinsic motivation experiment, separate regression equations
predicting opinion change from each self-perception measure, a term
representing the interaction between the self-perception and reward,
and the reward manipulation revealed that none of the Reward X Self-
Perceptions were significant (Fs < 1). Since the interaction be-
tween reward and retrieval of behaviors was critical to the
59
interpretation of the opinion change results, self-perception
measures cannot effectively be substituted for this retrieval
factor.
Attitudes as Schemata
Self-schemata have commonly been considered a representation
of the organization of information about the self on a particular
personality or attitude dimension, and not the organization of in-
formation about the self in general (Markus, 1977; Rogers, Kuiper,
& Kirker, 1977). This analysis implies that in the present research,
opinion change on preservation of the environment should not neces-
sarily be related to the cognitive structure underlying subjects'
opinions on other issues. Indeed, it was found that opinion change
was not effectively predicted from the retrieval of beliefs and be-
haviors concerning psychological research. Thus, consistent with
theories of cognitive schemata, it appears that opinion change was a
function of topic-specific retrieval and not general accessibility to
information in memory.
Attitude schemata have been conceptualized in terms of attitude
extremity (Judd & Kulik, 1980), and consistency between affective and
cognitive components of attitudes (Chaiken & Baldwin, Note 1). The
present findings suggest that attitude extremity is not necessarily
related to the organization of information concerning an attitude
issue. Although in the persuasion experiment, subjects who indicated
many behaviors had more polarized attitudes than those who indicated
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few, analysis of covariance adjusted for extremity of initial opinions,
and the results remained supportive of the hypothesized effects of
retrieval on opinion change.
Affective-cognitive consistency theory and the present analysis
of access to attitudinally-relevant information have identified
similar relations between consistency or retrieval and opinion
change. Chaiken and Baldwin (Note 1) found that attitudes composed
of low consistency components, compared with high, were more likely
to reflect salient behaviors. This finding is comparable to the
fact that in the intrinsic motivation experiment, the attitudes of
subjects who could retrieve few behaviors, compared with many, were
derived more from recent behavior and the context in which it
occurred. It is not surprising that findings from these two studies
are similar. In terms of the present framework, affective-cognitive
consistency may be one by-product of a well-organized cognitive
structure. Consistency, then, may be related to retrieval because
these variables may both tap the organization of attitudinally-
relevant information. However, measures of access to prior exper-
iences and cognitions should in general be a better predictor of
opinions because they more directly measure this organization.
Measuring the number of beliefs and behaviors subjects indicate
in a limited period of time is only one means of identifying the
cognitive structure underlying attitude judgments. Other open
response measures can be devised to assess to what extent
attitudinally-relevant information is organized in memory, and thus
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to what extent it is retrievable. A hierarchical perspective of
memory would suggest that the order in which relevant beliefs and
experiences are indicated can reveal the degree of organization.
For example, a hierarchical structure would be indicated if the
abstract cognitions subjects list are followed by related, more
concrete instances. Subjects who list only unrelated, abstract
cognitions are less likely to have such a structure. This kind of
assessment of the content of subjects' beliefs and experiences would
be expected to have effects on opinion change similar to both the
retrieval measures employed in the present research and the measures
of cognitive schemata employed by other researchers.
Related Conceptions of Attitudes
It should be noted that the idea of attitude schemata is not the
only conception of attitudes which is related to the present dis-
tinction between memory- and context-derived judgments. For example,
Rokeach (1970) proposed that attitudes "are arranged along a central-
peripheral dimension wherein the more central . . . are more salient
or important, more resistant to change, and if changed exert relative-
ly greater effects on other parts" (p. 117). However, it is unclear
how attitude centrality would be operationalized because little
systematic research has been conducted on this proposition. In ad-
dition, Rokeach did not focus on the information that might underlie
central vs. noncentral attitudes. The concept of centrality was
conceived within the tradition of cognitive consistency theories,
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and thus does not explore the storage and retrieval of attitudinally-
relevant information, which is the focus of the present cognitive
approach.
Another conceptualization of attitudes which has some similarity
to the present analysis is McGuire's (1968) work on the inoculation
approach to resistance to persuasion. McGuire recognized that
attitudes such as those represented by cultural truisms (e.g., it's
good to brush your teeth twice a day) have little underlying cog-
nitive support and thus are very susceptible to persuasive attempts.
However, the focus of the inoculation work was on conferring re-
sistance to persuasion, and did not analyze the information under-
lying attitude judgments.
Conclusion
The findings of the two studies highlight the importance of
distinguishing between two types of attitudes: (a) attitudes
derived from prior experiences and beliefs organized in memory,
and (b) those derived from contextual cues and behavior. In both
the persuasion and intrinsic motivation experiments, subjects'
opinion change was a function of the degree to which they had
access to relevant information. This approach, which focuses on
access to topic-specific information, is concerned with the
immediate antecedents of change on particular issues. It is in
contrast to research which has generally been unsuccessful in
predicting opinion change from global personality traits, such as
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self-esteem (Eagly, in press).
The present analysis of the immediate antecedents of opinion
change does not specify how other determinates, such as one's
prior experiences, may affect the organization in memory of a self-
construct, and ultimately opinions. The fact that membership in
environmental groups was related to behavior retrieval indicates
that the retrieval factors reflect some differences in prior be-
havior. Yet membership proved to have a direct impact on opinion
change only in the intrinsic motivation experiment, F(l,83) = 7.00,
p_ < .02. Further research is needed to determine to what extent
differences in experiences and beliefs underlie differences in
access to attitudinally-relevant information in memory, and thus
what impact these prior experiences have on opinion change.
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FOOTNOTES
l
Although an attitude inference can result from attribution to
oneself or to the attitude object, perceivers' confidence in their
attitude judgments may depend on the causal factor that is identified
(Kelley, 1967). When assessing the validity of their perceptions,
people may infer that attitudes derived from self attributions reflect
something idiosyncratic about themselves whereas attitudes derived
from entity attributions may be perceived as consensual reactions
which reflect a characteristic of the attitude object. Kelley (1967)
suggests that entity attributions enable perceivers to feel relatively
confident in their judgments.
2
The number of behaviors and the number of beliefs subjects
listed were correlated (r =
.30, p_ < .05). Independent variables
that are correlated have been termed collinear. The degree of re-
lationship between these variables in the present study is small,
thus collinearity can be expected to result in somewhat conservative,
though not particularly biased, tests of significance.
3
Although the persuasion study was initially constructed so that
subjects received persuasive messages on one of two issues, preserva-
tion of the environment or energy conservation, preliminary data
analyses indicated that only the environmental message produced any
measurable opinion change. It may be that subjects did not change
their opinions on energy conservation because most of them were able
72
73
to retrieve a large amount of energy-related information from memory,
Indeed, the fact that subjects listed on the average a greater
number of beliefs and behaviors relevant to energy (Ms =4.22 and
3.87, respectively) than to environment could be due to the recent
national publicity campaign emphasizing conservation. The energy
topic was therefore dropped from the analysis of the persuasion
study and was not included in the intrinsic motivation study.


